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THE FIFTH AMENDMENT IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS: A
RATIONALE FOR ITS APPLICATION IN INVESTIGATIONS
AND DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS
ROBERT J. GOODWIN*
I. INTRODUCTION
Nearly twenty years ago, while delivering the Oliver Wendell
Holmes Lectures at Vanderbilt University, Professor Charles Alan
Wright observed that law by its nature tends to grow very slowly.1
As if to prove Professor Wright's observation, courts have bandied
about the application of various provisions of the Bill of Rights to
public school students for at least sixty years.2 As early as 1943, in
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,3 the United
States Supreme Court declared that "[t]he Fourteenth Amend-
ment... protects the citizen against the State ... and all of its
creatures-Boards of Education not excepted. [Boards of Educa-
tion] have ... important, delicate, and highly discretionary func-
tions, but none that they may not perform within the limits of the
Bill of Rights."' 4 Notwithstanding this pronouncement, later courts
have failed to define conclusively the scope of these rights and to
extend their full protection to public school students. The fifth
amendment stands as an example of this phenomenon. Courts ex-
amining the fifth amendment in this context have given diverse
opinions, concluding that the amendment apparently does not ap-
* Associate Professor and Director of Center for Advocacy and Clinical Education, Cum-
berland School of Law of Samford University; B.A., University of Missouri, 1971; J.D.,
Washington University, 1974.
1. Wright, The Constitution on the Campus, 22 VAND. L. REv. 1027, 1027 (1969).
2. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506
(1969) (The Supreme Court has upheld the ability of students and teachers to assert first
amendment rights for at least fifty years.); see also Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400
(1923) (The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment prevents the states from for-
bidding the teaching of a foreign language because such teaching implicates both a teacher's
right to teach and a parent's right to engage teachers).
3. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
4. Id. at 637.
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ply in public schools;5 that the amendment applies, but only in cer-
tain circumstances;' and that the amendment fully applies.7 Other
opinions tend to focus rather narrowly upon the giving of Mi-
randa8 warnings, holding that such warnings are not necessary for
interrogations conducted by school officials.'
Consistent with Barnette, a public school student clearly does
not forfeit the protection of the fifth amendment merely because
he or she enters a public school; 0 the more difficult issue concerns
how to apply the privilege against self-incrimination to students
accused of wrongdoing in the public schools. Accordingly, this Arti-
cle first examines the factors mandating that students retain the
fifth amendment's privilege against self-incrimination while at-
tending public schools, and, second, presents standards, consistent
with the fifth amendment, that officials should apply in public
school interrogations and disciplinary hearings.
5. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 248 Cal. App. 2d 867, -, 57 Cal. Rptr.
463, 472 (1967).
6. See, e.g., Picozzi v. Sandalow, 623 F. Supp. 1571, 1581-82 (E.D. Mich. 1986); Pollnow v.
Glennon, 594 F. Supp. 220, 222 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd, 757 F.2d 496 (2d Cir. 1985); Stern v.
New Haven Community Schools, 529 F. Supp. 31, 37 (E.D. Mich. 1981); Morale v. Grigel,
422 F. Supp. 988, 1003 (D.N.H. 1976); Furutani v. Ewigleben, 297 F. Supp. 1163, 1164-65
(N.D. Cal. 1969); Grossner v. Trustees of Columbia Univ., 287 F. Supp. 535, 550-51
(S.D.N.Y. 1968); Johnson v. Board of Educ., 62 Misc. 2d 929, 932-33, 310 N.Y.S.2d 429, 432-
33 (1970); Nzuve v. Castleton State College, 133 Vt. 225, 229, 335 A.2d 321, 324 (1975).
7. Gonzales v. McEuen, 435 F. Supp. 460, 470-71 (C.D. Cal. 1977); Caldwell v. Cannady,
340 F. Supp. 835, 841 (N.D. Tex. 1972); Goldwyn v. Allen, 54 Misc. 2d 94, 99, 281 N.Y.S.2d
899, 906 (1967); State ex rel. Sherman v. Hyman, 180 Tenn. 99, -, 171 S.W.2d 822, 826
(1942), cert. denied 319 U.S. 748 (1943).
8. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
9. Betts v. Board of Educ., 466 F.2d 629, 631 n.1 (7th Cir. 1972); Boynton v. Casey, 543 F.
Supp. 995, 997 (D. Me. 1982); Buttny v. Smiley, 281 F. Supp. 280, 287 (D. Colo. 1968);
Adams v. City of Dothan Bd. of Educ., 485 So. 2d 757, 761-62 (Ala. Civ. App. 1986); People
v. Shipp, 96 Ill. App. 2d 364, 366-67, 239 N.E.2d 296, 297-98 (1968); State ex rel. Feazell,
360 So. 2d 907, 909 (La. Ct. App. 1978); Birdsey v. Grand Blanc Community Schools, 130
Mich. App. 718, -, 344 N.W.2d 342, 344-45 (1983); In re Brendan H., 82 Misc. 2d 1077,
1078-81, 372 N.Y.S.2d 473, 476-78 (1975); State v. Wolfer, 39 Wash. App. 287, -, 693
P.2d 154, 158-59 (1984); see infra notes 109-27 and accompanying text.
10. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506-07
(1969) (citing West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943), for the
proposition that students do not shed their constitutional rights to free speech at the
schoolhouse gate).
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II. RECOGNIZING THE FIFTH AMENDMENT'S PRIVILEGE AGAINST
SELF-INCRIMINATION IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS
The initial inquiry, of course, involves whether the fifth amend-
ment's privilege against self-incrimination11 exists at all within the
public schools."2 Only after determining that students bring the
right with them into the public schools can courts determine the
related issue of how-if at all-the fifth amendment applies to
specific types of hearings or interrogations. 3 Determining whether
one of the guarantees of the Bill of Rights exists in public schools
for the benefit of students requires a three-step analysis. The first
step of the analysis requires a determination that the particular
amendment involved applies to public school officials through the
fourteenth amendment. Next, the court must examine the sub-
stance of the amendment involved and determine whether the
public school activity under scrutiny is within the scope of the
amendment. Finally, the court must determine whether the special
relationship between school officials and students makes the
amendment under analysis inapplicable in the public school
context."
11. "No person shall ... be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against him-
self, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... " U.S.
CONST. amend. V.
12. Cf. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 333-37 (1985) (determining the application of
the fourth amendment in the public school context).
In this Article, the term "public schools" includes only publicly-supported elementary and
secondary schools (grades one through twelve, generally). This Article does not address the
rights of college or university students in either a public or private setting. For a discussion
of constitutional rights in a college setting, see McKay, The Student as Private Citizen, 45
DEN. L.J. 558 (1968); Seavey, Dismissal of Students: "Due Process", 70 HARV. L. REV. 1406
(1957); Wright, supra note 1.
13. See Bartlett, Self-Incrimination and Public School Students, 15 J.L. & EDUC. 167
(1986) (explaining that the assertion of the fifth amendment can arise in two contexts: the
disciplinary hearing and the investigatory interrogation).
The investigatory interrogation raises issues concerning what warnings, if any, officials
must give a student to counteract any coercion inherent in the interrogation. Such action
implicates the Supreme Court's Miranda decision. For a full exploration of these issues, see
infra notes 109-27 and accompanying text.
14. The Supreme Court employed this three-step analysis in New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469
U.S. 325, 333-37 (1985). Although the Court did not indicate expressly in T.L.O. that lower
courts should apply this analysis in every case involving an extension of the Bill of Rights to
public school students, and although the Court did not designate its reasoning as a "three-
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A. Applying the Fifth Amendment to Public Schools and School
Officials
The first step in the Supreme Court's analysis requires a deter-
mination of whether the fifth amendment's privilege against self-
incrimination applies against school boards and school officials.
Undoubtedly it does apply to such entities as does the entire Bill
of Rights. In New Jersey v. T.L.O.'5 the Supreme Court reaffirmed
the principle of Barnette and held that "the Fourth Amendment
applies to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, and...
the actions of public school officials are subject to the limits placed
on state action by the Fourteenth Amendment .. ". ."I' Although
T.L.O. involved the application of the fourth amendment rather
than the fifth amendment, nothing in the Court's reasoning in
T.L.O. indicates an intention to limit this general principle to any
one particular constitutional right. In addition, the Court cited
Barnette favorably in another case dealing with the application of
the first amendment to public school officials."
Despite these strong indications that the fifth amendment ap-
plies in the public school context, at least one state court case ap-
parently holds that the fifth amendment does not apply in the
public schools.' 8 This case is inconsistent with the Supreme
Court's earlier reasoning in Barnette which applied the Bill of
step" analysis, one reasonably can assume that lower courts will employ this logical scheme
in similar cases.
In practice, only the second step presents difficulty. The Supreme Court affirmatively an-
swered the first step (that the particular amendment applies to public school officials) in
West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943), and T.L.O., 469 U.S. at
333. Furthermore, the Court apparently disposed of the third step (concerning the impact of
the special relationship, if any, between school officials and students upon extending a par-
ticular guarantee to public schools) in T.L.O. The Court stated in T.L.O. that the doctrine
of in loco parentis "is in tension with contemporary reality and the teachings of this Court,"
469 U.S. at 336, thereby, apparently, effectively denying the existence of a special relation-
ship between school officials and students. But see infra notes 42-49 and accompanying text.
15. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
16. Id. at 334.
17. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969). But
see Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 660 (1977) (holding the eighth amendment inapplica-
ble to corporal punishment in public schools).
18. Goldberg v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 248 Cal. App. 2d 867, -, 57 Cal. Rptr. 463,
475-76 (1967).
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Rights to public schools.19 The major problem with the reasoning
of the state court decision, however, is found in the analysis, not
the holding. The court indicated that the fifth amendment's privi-
lege against self-incrimination is not cognizable in the public
schools. Instead of making such a broad holding, the court should
have held that the type of conduct involved in the case was not
protected. Thus, the critical error in the case is its failure to distin-
guish between conduct that violates only ordinary school rules and
the violation of school rules that also violates criminal statutes.2
B. Applying the Fifth Amendment's Protections to Public School
Investigatory and Disciplinary Hearings
Even though the fifth amendment applies to the states and pub-
lic schools through the fourteenth amendment, the question re-
mains whether the fifth amendment creates any rights enforceable
against public schools and their officials during the conduct of in-
vestigations or disciplinary hearings. This question is somewhat
more difficult.
The case of Ingraham v. Wright2l fuels the uncertainty. In In-
graham the Supreme Court questioned whether the infliction of
corporal punishment on children attending public school violated
the eighth amendment.22 After looking at the history of the eighth
amendment and prior Supreme Court cases construing the amend-
ment, the Court held that the proscription against cruel and un-
19. 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943).
20. Professor Wright stressed the importance of distinguishing, in a fifth amendment
analysis, between violations of school rules and violations of school rules that also violates
criminal statutes:
Some violations of university rules, such as taking over a campus building, are
also violations of criminal statutes. Other violations of rules, such as cheating,
are not. . . . [T]he cheating violation is quite different. The disciplinary pro-
ceeding is not itself a "criminal case" within the meaning of the fifth amend-
ment, and since cheating is not a crime, there is no other "criminal case" in
which the student's testimony can be used against him. Thus the university
may compel the student's testimony in the cheating case if it thinks it is worth
the effort to do so.
Wright, supra note 1, at 1077 (footnotes omitted). For a full exploration of this aspect of the
fifth amendment, see infra notes 75-82 and accompanying text.
21. 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
22. Id. at 653.
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usual punishment was designed to protect those convicted of
crimes,23 not public school children facing corporal punishment. 4
Eight years later, in T.L.O., the Court considered whether the
fourth amendment's proscription against unreasonable search and
seizure protected school children from unreasonable searches con-
ducted by school officials. As in Ingraham, the Court examined the
amendment's history and Supreme Court precedent.2 5 Specifically,
the Court asked whether "this Court has . . . limited the [fourth]
amendment's prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures to
operations conducted by the police."26 Unlike Ingraham, however,
the Court in T.L.O. concluded that the fourth amendment did ap-
ply to searches conducted by school authorities,17 even though the
text of the fourth amendment does not mention schools or school
officials.28
Although school officials are bound by the Bill of Rights, Ingra-
ham and T.L.O. together indicate that an amendment in the Bill of
Rights is not automatically enforceable in each situation that
arises in the public schools. The history and purpose of a particu-
lar amendment also are relevant in determining its applicability to
a given situation.29 One cannot determine the viability of the fifth
amendment's proscription against self-incrimination in the public
schools without first examining prior Supreme Court cases constru-
ing the amendment and its history. Presumably, this examination
will reveal whether the drafters intended the amendment to apply
generally in public schools or if they intended to limit fifth amend-
ment protection to certain types of activity.30 Accordingly, this Ar-
23. Id. at 666.
24. Id. at 665.
25. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 335-37 (1985).
26. Id. at 335.
27. Id. at 336-37.
28. In T.L.O., New Jersey argued that the fourth amendment should apply only to law
enforcement officers and not to public schools. The Court rejected this argument. Id. at 335.
29. Compare T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 334-35 (stating that the fourth amendment applies in
public schools as well as to "law enforcement" officers) with Ingraham 430 U.S. at 665 (stat-
ing that the eighth amendment was designed to protect those convicted of "crimes" and is
not applicable to public school students facing disciplinary corporal punishment).
30. The issue in this Article is a narrower question than simply whether the provisions of
the Bill of Rights reach public school students and administrators. This Article examines
the meaning of the fifth amendment to determine if it has any application to the activities
of students and school officials. The Court made this inquiry in Ingraham without eroding
[Vol. 28:683
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ticle examines prior Supreme Court cases to determine whether
the Court has limited the fifth amendment's prohibition against
self-incrimination to more traditional law enforcement activities or
whether fifth amendment protection extends to the questioning of
students by school officials.
The fifth amendment, just like the fourth, can apply in civil as
well as criminal settings. 1 The Supreme Court and lower courts
alike have applied the fifth amendment to grand jury proceed-
ings, 3 2 prison disciplinary proceedings,33 federal legislative commit-
tee hearings,34 municipal employee misconduct hearings,35 state
traffic ticket "fixing" investigations,36 disbarment proceedings, 7
and Internal Revenue Service proceedings.3 8 Although the Su-
preme Court has not rendered an opinion concerning the applica-
bility of the fifth amendment in public schools, it has discussed the
availability of the amendment in civil and administrative proceed-
ings in general. The Court has stated:
The privilege [against self-incrimination] can be claimed in any
proceeding, be it criminal or civil, administrative or judicial, in-
vestigatory or adjudicatory ... it protects any disclosures
which the witness may reasonably apprehend could be used in a
criminal prosecution or which could lead to other evidence that
might be so used.39
Furthermore, the Court said, "[I]t is also clear that the availability
of the privilege does not turn upon the type of proceeding in which
the principle that the Bill of Rights applies in the public schools; the Court simply held that
the specific activity at issue (corporal punishment) did not violate the eighth amendment.
31. See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 335 (stating that the fourth amendment generally applies to
the activities of civil authorities).
32. See, e.g., Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70 (1973); Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273
(1968).
33. See, e.g., Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308 (1976).
34. See, e.g., Schlohower v. Board of Higher Educ.; 350 U.S. 551 (1956).
35. See, e.g., Uniformed Sanitation Men Ass'n, Inc. v. Commissioner of Sanitation, 392
U.S. 280 (1968).
36. See, e.g., Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967).
37. See, e.g., Spevak v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967) (plurality opinion).
38. See, e.g., United States v. Goldsmith, 272 F. Supp. 924, 927 (E.D.N.Y. 1967) ("The
right of the witness to claim the privilege [against self-incrimination] . . .may not be di-
luted by denominating the Internal Revenue Service inquisition a civil proceeding.").
39. In Re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 47-48 (1967) (quoting Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378
U.S. 52, 94 (1964) (White, J., concurring)) (footnote omitted).
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its protection is invoked, but upon the nature of the statement or
admission and the exposure which it invites."4 Such language and
precedents make clear that the fifth amendment's privilege against
self-incrimination is enforceable against public school officials in
disciplinary hearings or in any other public school "proceeding. "41
C. The Relationship Between Public School Students and Public
School Administrators as a Factor Mitigating Against Applying
the Fifth Amendment
The third and final step in the three-step analysis42 implicates
the aged in loco parentis doctrine. 43 Whatever viability this doc-
trine once had,44 the principle is no longer a sufficient reason for
failing to apply the Bill of Rights in public schools.
In T.L.O., school officials argued that even if public school offi-
cials are bound by the Bill of Rights, and even if the fourth
amendment generally applies to civil authorities, school officials
are immune from the dictates of the fourth amendment because of
the in loco parentis doctrine.45 In rejecting that argument, the
40. Id. at 49; see also Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308 (1976), where the Court said:
[Tihe Fifth Amendment. . . "privileges [an individual] not to answer official
questions . . . in any other proceeding, civil or criminal, formal or informal,
where the answers might incriminate him in future criminal proceedings"
.... if inmates are compelled in... [disciplinary] proceedings to furnish tes-
timonial evidence that might incriminate them in later criminal proceedings,
they must be offered "whatever immunity is required to supplant the privi-
lege" and may not be required to "waive such immunity."
Id. at 317 (quoting Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77, 85 (1973)).
41. One has difficulty in trying to distinguish between an investigatory proceeding or dis-
ciplinary hearing in a public school which could result in suspension or expulsion and simi-
lar proceedings conducted by other governmental administrative bodies. The only possible
distinction is based on policy, not precedent.
The precedent discussed thus far refers to testimony that might incriminate in criminal
proceedings, not in administrative proceedings. For a discussion of this limitation, see infra
notes 75-110 and accompanying text.
42. See supra note 14.
43. The term in loco parentis refers to the legal doctrine that places a party in the posi-
tion of parent, with all the privileges, rights and responsibilities of a natural parent. Com-
pare Goldberg v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 248 Cal. App. 867, -, 57 Cal. Rptr. 463, 470
n.11 (1967) (court cites seven cases using the doctrine) with New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S.
325, 336 (1985) (doctrine is in conflict with "contemporary reality" when applied to public
school students in the context of fourth amendment violations).
44. See Wright, supra note 1, at 1030.
45. 469 U.S. at 336-37.
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Court put to rest this application of the in loco parentis doctrine
once and for all. The Court stated that such reasoning was "in ten-
sion with contemporary reality and the teachings of this Court. '46
The Court further stated that today's public school officials exer-
cise control over students under authority of public educational
and disciplinary policies, not because of parental delegation of au-
thority.47 Accordingly, courts cannot possibly view public school of-
ficials as anything but "state" actors when examining their conduct
vis-&-vis students, 48 and, therefore, school officials are not immune
from the dictates of the fifth amendment because of the special
nature of their relationship with students.49
III. STANDARDS GOVERNING APPLICATION OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT
IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS
Concluding that the fifth amendment privilege against self-in-
crimination applies to official interrogations of public school stu-
dents and to public school disciplinary hearings begins, rather than
ends, the inquiry.50 Several difficult issues now arise. First, what
does "coercive" or "compelled" mean when applied to statements
made by students to school officials within the public schools? Sec-
ond, how does the fifth amendment apply to violations of noncrim-
inal school rules, such as cheating or tardiness for class? Third,
when the alleged misconduct violates both a school rule and a
criminal statute, can a compelled statement be used to penalize a
student by suspending or expelling the student from school, as
long as the statement is not used in a criminal prosecution? Fi-
46. Id. at 336. One year later, however, in Bethel School Dist. v. Fraser, 106 S. Ct. 3159
(1986), the Court breathed some life back into in loco parentis, at least in some circum-
stances. The Court stated that school authorities act in loco parentis when they "protect
children-especially in a captive audience-from exposure to sexually explicit, indecent, or
lewd speech." Id. at 3165.
47. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 336-37.
48. Id.
49. Even the California case holding the privilege against self-incrimination inapplicable
to public school students did not use the doctrine of in loco parentis as supportive rationale
for its holding. Goldberg v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 248 Cal. App. 2d 867, -, 57 Cal.
Rptr. 463, 470, 475 (1967).
50. See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 337 ("To hold that the Fourth Amendment applies to searches
conducted by school authorities is only to begin the inquiry into the standards governing
such searches.").
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nally, do Miranda warnings have any applicability in public
schools when a student is questioned by a school official? Estab-
lished fifth amendment jurisprudence indicates with some accuracy
how courts should and will resolve these issues when fifth amend-
ment doctrine in the public schools comes to fruition.51
A. Defining Coercive or Compelled Statements in the Public
School Context: The Doctrine of "Substantial Educational
Interest"
Students possess the same fifth amendment rights as other indi-
viduals.52 Accordingly, extracting a statement of criminal wrongdo-
ing by whipping a student with a leather strap53 or by interrogat-
ing the student five straight days54 would be coercive and would
violate the fifth amendment. Besides such blatant conduct, how-
ever, unique characteristics of the public school setting may re-
quire supplementation or modification of fifth amendment doc-
trine to protect student rights adequately. In addition to conduct
considered coercive by traditional fifth amendment jurisprudence,
for example, courts should consider a statement "coerced" or
"compelled," and thus offensive to the fifth amendment, if a school
official extracts the statement from a student under threat of dep-
rivation of any substantial educational interest.
Although the fifth amendment, as construed by Supreme Court
decisions, does not preclude a person from voluntarily testifying or
51. See generally Wright, supra note 1, at 1027-28.
52. Spevak v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 516 (1967) (plurality opinion) ("We find no room in the
privilege against self-incrimination for classifications of people so as to deny it to some and
extend it to others."). Courts may alter the nature of a particular right when applying it to a
minor; such practice, of course, is unrelated to whether the minor is also a student.
53. See Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936). In Brown, the defendants confessed to
a murder after "their backs were cut to pieces with a leather strap with buckles on it, and
they were. . . made by the. . . deputy definitely to understand that the whipping would be
continued unless and until they confessed." Id. at 282. Defendants presumably were not
students, Id. at 281, and the interrogator was a deputy, not a school official, Id. at 282. The
Court held that the conviction violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Id. at 287.
54. See Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 231 (1940) (defendants in murder trial con-
fessed after five days of continuous questioning). The Supreme Court never identified the
defendants as students, and the interrogators were law enforcement personnel. Id. at 231.
The Court held that the method by which the sheriff obtained the confessions violated the
due process clause. Id. at 241.
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giving statements about matters that may tend to incriminate him
or her,55 the amendment does preclude obtaining a statement
through coercion. 6 The term "coercion" is an elastic word that
may mean different things in different settings. In the public
school context, for example, an administrator may suspect a stu-
dent of wrongdoing5" and threaten to impose a penalty unless the
student makes a statement. The administrator may threaten to
suspend or expel the student, to call the police, or to impose a less
"severe" penalty such as keeping the student after school. At some
point, these threats become coercion, thereby implicating the fifth
amendment.
The Supreme Court has held that the state may not threaten to
impose economic or other sanctions upon a person to induce him
or her to forego the fifth amendment right to remain silent.58 The
Court applied this principle to prevent the state from removing a
person from office because he or she exercised the fifth amendment
right to remain silent during state grand jury proceedings.5 If an
individual succumbs to such a threat and speaks, however, the
Court has held that the state cannot use the statement against that
person in a later criminal prosecution."0
55. United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424, 427 (1943). "Voluntary" conduct is difficult to
discern in the abstract. It becomes even more difficult when dealing with students because
many students are minors, thus implicating issues of competency and ability to understand
the nature of the right not to speak. For a discussion of these issues, see infra notes 109-27
and accompanying text. See generally Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979) (scrutinizing
the voluntary nature of a statement made to police by a juvenile).
56. See United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424, 427 ("The [fifth] Amendment speaks of
compulsion.").
57. At this point this Article does not attempt to differentiate between wrongdoing that
merely violates a school rule and wrongdoing that violates both a school rule and a criminal
statute. This section focuses on the meaning of "coercion" or "compulsion" in a general
sense. For a discussion of whether coercion or compulsion to speak violates the fifth amend-
ment when the student under investigation violates a school rule alone, see infra notes 75-82
and accompanying text.
58. Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 434 (1984); Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S.
801, 805 (1977).
59. Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 805 (1977). The threatened penalty, removal
from four nonsalaried state Democratic Party positions, was a noneconomic sanction.
60. Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 500 (1967). The Court held that a witness
threatened with discharge from employment if he or she remains silent does not waive the
privilege by speaking. Id. at 497-99. Furthermore, any statements made under such threat
are excludable in subsequent criminal prosecutions. Id. at 500.
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In Garrity v. New Jersey,"' the Supreme Court elaborated upon
the type of pressure or threat which is impermissible under the
fifth amendment.6 2 The Court spoke of "mental" coercion and
"subtle pressures" and indicated that "the question is whether the
accused was deprived of his 'free choice to admit, to deny, or to
refuse to answer.' "63 The Court held that statements obtained
under threat of "removal from office" 4 would implicate the protec-
tion of the fifth amendment and that this protection extends to
"all" members of our society. 5
One court has referred to the Garrity decision as holding that "it
was unconstitutionally coercive to condition the exercise of the
fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination on the loss of
substantial economic interests. '6 6 By slightly changing the last
phrase to "loss of substantial educational interests," one may de-
rive a workable standard for identifying unconstitutionally coercive
conduct within the public school setting. 7 This proposed standard
also incorporates the underlying concerns of Garrity because
threats to deprive educational interests would constitute "subtle
pressures"6 " depriving a student of his or her "free choice to admit,
to deny, or to refuse to answer."69
By defining impermissibly coercive penalties or threats as those
which imperil substantial educational interests of the student, such
as exclusion from an examination or suspension from school, courts
would recognize the significance of a student's property interest in
61. 385 U.S. 493 (1967).
62. Id. at 496; see also Spevak v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 515 (1967) (plurality opinion)
(" '[Plenalty' is not restricted to fine or imprisonment. It means ... the imposition of any
sanction which makes assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege 'costly.' ").
63. Garrity, 385 U.S. at 496 (quoting Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 241 (1941)).
64. Id. at 500.
65. Id.
66. Securities & Exchange Comm'n v. Gilbert, 79 F.R.D. 683, 685 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
67. The courts that have grappled with threats that school administrators have made in
order to obtain statements from students have not determined conclusively what constitutes
coercion. See, e.g., Stern v. New Haven Community Schools, 529 F. Supp. 31, 37 (E.D. Mich.
1981) (holding that a principal's "breach" of promise not to call police raises issue of volun-
tariness in responding to questioning, but does not implicate the fifth amendment
seriously).
68. Garrity, 385 U.S. at 496.
69. Id. (quoting Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 241 (1941)).
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education.7 0 At the same time, the elasticity of the term "substan-
tial" affords public school officials limited discretion in questioning
students about misconduct and disciplinary violations. For exam-
ple, threatening to keep a student after class or to make a student
write a thousand-word theme does not deprive the student of a
substantial educational interest and thus would not be considered
constitutionally coercive under this proposed standard.7 1
The policy promoted by this proposed standard is similar to that
pronounced by the Supreme Court in New Jersey v. T.L.O.7 2 in-
volving fourth amendment searches and seizures. In T.L.O. the
Court recognized that school officials need "effective methods to
deal with breaches of public order," but felt that courts must bal-
ance this need against a student's legitimate expectations of pri-
vacy.73 A school official needs to be able to interrogate students
and investigate misconduct to maintain order within the public
schools. When an administrator threatens deprivation of any sub-
stantial educational interest in an effort to extract a statement, or
when an administrator deprives a student of such an interest be-
cause of the student's silence, however, permissible investigation
ends and unconstitutional coercion begins. In subsequent criminal
prosecutions courts should exclude statements that a student made
under such a threat. If the student subjected to such a threat de-
clined to talk, courts should prevent the school from imposing the
threatened sanction.7 4
70. See generally Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975) (holding that students have a
legitimate entitlement to an education recognizable as a property interest protected by the
fourteenth amendment).
71. Not only do the cited examples not threaten a "substantial" interest, they also proba-
bly do not threaten deprivation of an "educational" interest. The suggested standard would
require both that the threatened deprivation be directed at an "educational" interest and
that the educational interest involved be "substantial." If either of these two elements are
missing, then arguably the kind of coercion condemned by the Supreme Court in Garrity is
also missing.
Adjurations to tell the truth or explanations of the consequences a student faces for par-
ticular misconduct would not violate the proposed standard. See, e.g., Adams v. City of
Dothan Bd. of Educ., 485 So. 2d 757, 761 (Ala. Civ. App. 1986).
72. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
73. Id. at 337.
74. See Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 434 (1984).
A related issue arises if school administrators threaten a substantial educational interest
but do not ask the student to waive his or her right to refrain from self-incrimination in
subsequent criminal proceedings. Such a situation might arise if the school only intends to
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B. Applying the Fifth Amendment to Student Misconduct That
Violates a School Rule But Not a Criminal Statute
Some student misconduct violates a school rule but does not also
violate a criminal statute. -Examples of this situation are easy to
imagine: smoking in prohibited areas, cheating on an exam, re-
peated tardiness, and minor classroom disruptions. 5
The text of the fifth amendment refers only to "criminal
case[s], ' ' 76 but the Supreme Court has stated that the fifth amend-
ment privileges an individual to remain silent in any proceeding,
civil or criminal, "where the answers might incriminate him in fu-
ture criminal proceedings.1 77 Similarly, in a probation revocation
case, the Court reaffirmed this limitation:
The situation would be different if the questions put to a proba-
tioner were relevant to his probationary status and posed no re-
alistic threat of incrimination in a separate criminal proceeding.
If, for example, a residential restriction were imposed as a con-
dition of probation, it would appear unlikely that a violation of
that condition would be a criminal act. Hence, a claim of the
Fifth Amendment privilege in response to questions relating to a
residential condition could not validly rest on the ground that
the answer might be used to incriminate if the probationer was
tried for another crime .... Although a revocation proceeding
must comport with the requirements of due process, it is not a
criminal proceeding.7s
use the coerced statement to discipline the student in school, ostensibly leaving the student
free to assert the fifth amendment as to any incriminating statements made to the school
official in a later criminal prosecution. For a discussion of this issue, see infra notes 83-109
and accompanying text.
75. Examples of the opposing situation, where violation of a school rule does violate a
criminal statute, include possession of a controlled substance or assault on a teacher or
classmate.
76. "No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against him-
self. ... U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added).
77. Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77 (1973) (emphasis added); see also United States
v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115, 130 (1980) (stating that a person claiming the privilege must be
confronted with substantial and real, not imaginary, incrimination).
78. Murphy, 465 U.S. at 435 n.7. The dissent in Murphy made the point in a more direct
fashion: "If a truthful response might reveal that he has violated a condition of his proba-
tion but would not subject him to criminal prosecution, the state may insist that he respond
and may penalize him for refusing to do so. Id. at 441 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added) (footnote omitted). Inserting the phrase "public school policy" for "condition of his
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Accordingly, the privilege does not apply when a student faces
only punishment from school officials for violation of a school rule.
Although the Supreme Court has not considered this issue in the
public school context, most lower courts are in accord.79
In summary, the nature of the infraction, not its public school
setting, determines whether the fifth amendment privilege against
self-incrimination is available.80 A school administrator in some
situations may use coercive threats or corporal punishment to ob-
tain admissions, or may draw adverse inferences from the student's
silence. 1 Such conduct is permissible constitutionally if the infrac-
tion concerned only the violation of a school policy and thus did
not implicate a criminal statute or the fifth amendment.2
probation" in Justice Marshall's dissent shows the strength of the analogy to violation of
noncriminal public school rules.
79. See, e.g., Picozzi v. Sandalow, 623 F. Supp. 1571, 1581-82 (D.C. Mich. 1986) (stating
that a person may assert the privilege in a civil proceeding, but the privilege only protects
that person from criminal exposure); Boynton v. Casey, 543 F. Supp. 995, 997 n.3 (D. Me.
1982) (holding that, where possession of marijuana violated a school policy but was not a
criminal offense in Maine, questioning a student concerning marijuana use did not involve
answers that might incriminate the student); Morale v. Grigel, 422 F. Supp. 988, 1003
(D.N.H. 1976) (holding that where student is not a criminal defendant and the state does
not seek to make evidentiary use of silence in a criminal proceeding, the school can penalize
silence as indication of guilt without violating the fifth amendment). But see Goldwyn v.
Allen, 54 Misc. 2d 94, 99, 281 N.Y.S. 2d 899, 905-06 (1967) ("commenting" that a child
cannot be deprived of fifth amendment rights in an administrative proceeding, implying
that the fifth amendment applies in a misconduct situation involving only cheating on a
high school exam).
80. See Wright, supra note 1, at 1077.
81. Cf. Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 317-18 (1976) (stating that the fifth amend-
ment does not forbid adverse inferences against inmates in disciplinary proceedings).
82. A public school administrator may not threaten or physically abuse students with
complete immunity just because the fifth amendment is not involved. The school board,
local custom, good sense, relative openness of the public schools, and fear of a civil action
for damages may impose limits on an administrator's authority in such cases. See, e.g., In-
graham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 657, 670-71 (1977) (holding that although the eighth
amendment is not implicated in a situation where a child is paddled by school administra-
tor, even though injury results, the child may have a civil cause of action for assault in the
appropriate state court).
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C. Asserting the Fifth Amendment Privilege in the School Disci-
plinary Setting When Violation of a School Rule is Also a Viola-
tion of a Criminal Statute: The "Public Trust" Doctrine of Gard-
ner v. Broderick
In those situations where violation of a school rule also violates a
criminal statute-thereby implicating the protections of the fifth
amendment-applying the fifth amendment in a "blanket" fashion
may pose a problem. Although a student may assert the fifth
amendment in any proceeding where the misconduct may subject
the student to criminal prosecution, school officials may seek the
statements solely for school disciplinary purposes and not for use
in a subsequent criminal prosecution. If school officials do not ask
a student to waive the privilege, leaving him or her free to assert it
in a future criminal prosecution, or if officials grant the student
immunity from criminal prosecution, perhaps school officials then
may compel the student to speak under penalty of being sus-
pended or expelled for remaining silent. The implications of this
suggestion are significant. If courts accept this proposition, then a
school administrator who suspects a student of misconduct could
suspend or expel that student for remaining silent in the face of
questioning about the offense, as long as the student remains free
to assert the privilege against self-incrimination in any subsequent
criminal prosecution. A prosecuting attorney who fears difficulty in
obtaining a criminal conviction conceivably could forego criminal
charges in order to allow the public school an opportunity to deal
with the student free of fifth amendment restraints. In essence, ad-
ministrators could remove "problem" students from school not for
the offense they are suspected of committing, which might present
proof problems, but for failure to cooperate with the school's inves-
tigation of misconduct.
A line of Supreme Court cases deals with the imposition of non-
criminal penalties in the administrative context for exercising the
fifth amendment privilege.8 3 Minnesota v. Murphy84 may be the
83. This line of cases begins with Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967), and con-
cludes with Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420 (1984). Justice Brennan discussed the scope
of these cases in his dissent in Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 328-34 (1976) (Brennan,
J., dissenting), and Justice Marshall analyzed them again in Murphy, 465 U.S. at 441-49
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
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most instructive of these cases because the majority directly ad-
dressed the issue in a footnote,85 and the dissent amplified the ma-
jority's discussion. 6 In Murphy, the Court considered the fifth
amendment rights of a probationer and stated that
a state may validly insist on answers to even incriminating ques-
tions ... as long as it recognizes that the required answers may
not be used in a criminal proceeding and thus eliminates the
threat of incrimination .... [N]othing in the Federal Constitu-
tion would prevent a State from revoking probation for a refusal
to answer that violated an express condition of probation or
from using the probationer's silence as "one of a number of fac-
tors to be considered by the finder of fact" in deciding whether
other conditions of probation have been violated. 7
The dissent elaborated upon the above language and indicated
that three possible situations actually were involved: 1) if a truth-
ful answer might lead to parole revocation but not to criminal
prosecution, the state may insist upon a response and penalize the
failure to talk by revoking parole; 2) if a truthful answer might
lead to criminal liability, the probationer may refuse to answer and
the state may not attempt to coerce an answer; 3) if a truthful
answer to a question might lead to both a criminal penalty and
probation revocation, the state still may insist upon an answer, but
only in return for an express guarantee of immunity from criminal
prosecution. 8
The third situation that the dissent addressed is comparable to
public school situations in which a truthful answer concerning stu-
dent misconduct might lead both to deprivation of a substantial
educational interest and to criminal penalties. For example, the
sale of illegal drugs on campus would violate both formal school
84. 465 U.S. 420 (1984).
85. Id. at 434 n.7.
86. Id. at 442 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
87. 465 U.S. at 435-36 & n.7 (quoting Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 808 n.5
(1977)).
88. Id. at 442 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The fifth amendment, as currently construed,
requires prosecutors to grant only "use" immunity (permitting the state to prosecute a per-
son for any crime provided only that his compelled statement is not used against him)
rather than transactional immunity (preventing prosecution of a person for any occurrence
about which he speaks) in the administrative hearing. Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S.
801, 809 (1977).
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policy and the state's criminal statutes. If the above proposition
from Murphy is applied in this situation, schools may suspend or
expel a student who refuses to talk to his high school principal
about the violation of the school policy as long as the student pos-
sesses immunity from the criminal prosecution.89
In the absence of further analysis, the line of cases just discussed
indicates that school officials may compel students accused of
criminal conduct to incriminate themselves in school disciplinary
proceedings if they are granted use immunity from criminal prose-
cutions. Imposing such noncriminal penalties upon a student, how-
ever, is inconsistent with the fifth amendment and also is poor
public policy.
A deeper analysis of this issue requires an examination of the
development of fifth amendment doctrine in this area. Admittedly,
at least two cases hold that penalizing a student's silence in school
disciplinary situations is consistent with the fifth amendment in
general and with Supreme Court cases interpreting the fifth
89. Even before the Supreme Court's decision in Murphy, some courts held that public
school administrtors could compel a student to speak in school disciplinary hearings, even
when criminal charges were pending, as long as the student remained free to assert the fifth
amendment in the criminal prosecution. E.g., Furutani v. Ewigleben, 297 F. Supp. 1163,
1164-65 (N.D. Cal. 1969); see also Nzuve v. Castleton State College, 133 Vt. 225, 232, 335
A.2d 321, 326 (1975) (generally adopting the reasoning of Furutani, but noting that stipu-
lated college procedures granted Nzuve a right to remain silent at student disciplinary hear-
ings without silence being used against him). These cases drew upon the Supreme Court
decision in Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967), as authority for their reasoning.
Furutani, 297 F. Supp. at 1165; Nzuve, 133 Vt. at 232-33, 335 A.2d at 326.
Also, some cases support the related proposition that authorities may use a student's si-
lence against him or her in a school disciplinary hearing as an inference of guilt, as long as
they do not carry the inference of guilt over into a criminal prosecution. These cases gener-
ally have not involved situations where the student also faced criminal penalties for the in-
school misconduct. See, e.g., Boynton v. Casey, 543 F. Supp. 995, 997 n.3 (D. Me. 1982)
(student's possession of marijuana was not a criminal offense under state law); Morale v.
Grigel, 422 F. Supp. 988, 1003 (D.N.H. 1976). These cases draw upon the Supreme Court
decision in Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308 (1976), as authority for their holding. Boyn-
ton, 543 F. Supp. at 997 n.3; Morale, 422 F. Supp. at 1003. Baxter held that the fifth
amendment does not forbid adverse inferences against parties to civil actions when they
refuse to testify in the civil action and that a state that grants immunity from criminal
prosecution may draw whatever inference the circumstances warrant from silence in the
civil hearing. Id. at 318. The Baxter opinion was specific in contrasting this situation to a
criminal case where neither the judge nor the prosecutor may suggest that the jury infer
guilt from the defendant's silence. Id. at 319. But cf. Caldwell v. Cannady, 340 F. Supp. 835,
840-41 (N.D. Tex. 1972) (holding that an adverse inference drawn from a student's silence
at a school disciplinary hearing cannot be used against the student).
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amendment in particular.90 Both cases rely on Garrity v. New
Jersey91 to reach this conclusion.92 The reasoning of these cases,
however, is inconsistent with an important aspect of Garrity and
its progeny.
In Garrity, police officers had testified at a state investigation
into alleged traffic ticket "fixing" after supervisors told them that
failure to testify could subject them to removal from office. The
testimony they gave under threat of removal from their jobs subse-
quently was introduced against them in criminal prosecutions aris-
ing from the investigations, and the police officers were con-
victed.9 3 The Supreme Court reversed the convictions, holding the
statements inadmissible because they were obtained under coer-
cion in violation of the fourteenth amendment.9 4
Relying upon Gdrrity as authority for the proposition that
school administrators may compel students to give up their privi-
lege against self-incrimination in the school disciplinary setting so
long as the students still may assert it in a later criminal proceed-
ing overlooks a critical distinction between police officers, who are
state agents, and students. Justice Fortas made a similar distinc-
tion in his concurrence to Garrity's companion case, Spevak v.
Klein. 5 He indicated that the state could discharge a police officer
for failure to answer questions in a disciplinary hearing concerning
his conduct because of the officer's employment relationship with
the state.9 8 Spevak, however, involved a disbarment proceeding
against a lawyer. Justice Fortas concluded that, because a lawyer is
not an agent of the state, presumably the state's interest was not
as significant as it was with a state agent. Accordingly, the attor-
ney's fifth amendment rights should not be diminished in any de-
gree 9 7 One year later, in Gardner v. Broderick," Justice Fortas's
90. Furutani v. Ewigleben, 297 F. Supp. 1163 (N.D. Cal. 1969); Nzuve v. Castleton State
College, 133 Vt. 225, 335 A.2d 321 (1975).
91. 385 U.S. 493 (1967).
92. Furutani, 297 F. Supp. at 1165; Nzuve, 133 Vt. at 232-33, 335 A.2d at 326 (The court
in Nzuve cited Furutani as well as Garrity to support its holding.).
93. Garrity, 385 U.S. at 494-95, 500.
94. Id. at 500.
95. 385 U.S. 511 (1967) (plurality opinion).
96. Id. at 519-20 (Fortas, J., concurring).
97. Id. ("I would distinguish between a lawyer's right to remain silent and that of a public
employee .... The special responsibilities that [the lawyer] assumes as licensee of the
1987]
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analysis became the Court's opinion. Writing this time for the ma-
jority, and referring to his concurrence in Spevak,99 Justice Fortas
indicated that the state could, in an administrative hearing, fire a
state employee for refusing to answer questions that were "specifi-
cally, directly and narrowly" related to their official duties. 100 The
state possessed such power, he continued, because the state em-
ployee is a "trustee of the public interest."''1 The same day that
the Court decided Gardner, Justice Fortas put the final touches on
this aspect of fifth amendment doctrine in Uniformed Sanitation
Men Association, Inc. v. Commissioner of Sanitation.0 2 Using the
term "public trust," Justice Fortas wrote that "public employees
.. .subject themselves to dismissal if they refuse to account for
their performance of their public trust, after proper proceedings,
which do not involve an attempt to coerce them to relinquish their
constitutional rights.' 0 3 This doctrine limits the class of individu-
als who may be penalized at administrative hearings for refusal to
respond to questioning to those persons in a position of "public
trust," such as public employees, in situations where officials do
not ask them to relinquish their fifth amendment rights and ask
them questions that specifically, directly, and narrowly relate to
that public trust.104
State and officer of the court do not carry with them a dimunition, however limited, of his
Fifth Amendment rights.").
In commenting on Justice Fortas's concurrence in Spevak, Justice Brennan wrote, "[Jus-
tice Fortas] wrote separately because he was of the view that state employees enjoyed a
lesser protection. He agreed with the result [in Spevak], however, because Spevak . . .was
not a state employee." Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 309, 329 n.2 (1976) (Brennan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
98. 392 U.S. 273 (1968).
99. Id. at 278 n.5 (citing Spevak v. Klein, 385 U.S. 519 (1967) (Fortas, J., concurring in
the judgment)).
100. Id. at 278.
101. Id. at 277-78.
102. 392 U.S. 280 (1968).
103. Id. at 285.
104. The "public trust" doctrine of Gardner and Sanitation Men presently may be under
attack in the Supreme Court. Although the Court may not seek to eliminate the doctrine, it
may ignore it or broaden it to the point where it has little meaning. For example, five years
after Sanitation Men the Court, without specifically addressing the point, seemed to affirm
Justice Fortas's public trust doctrine. Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 84 (1973) ("[Gliven
adequate immunity, the State may plainly insist that employees either answer questions
• ..or suffer the loss of employment." (emphasis added)). In 1976, however, Justice White's
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The significance of Gardner and Sanitation Men in the public
school setting, and the factor overlooked by the courts in both
Furutani and Nzuve, is that public school students are not em-
ployees of the state. They hold no position of "public trust" and,
accordingly, stand in the position described by Justice Fortas in
his Spevak concurrence as persons who should suffer no "diminu-
tion, however limited of [their] Fifth Amendment rights."'105
majority opinion in Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308 (1976), did not mention "public
trust" or "public employee," rather it alluded to "important state interests" served by disci-
plinary proceedings in prisons other than conviction for crime. Id. at 319. Baxter held that
the fifth amendment did not forbid adverse inferences from silence in prison disciplinary
hearings. Id. at 317. Despite the fact that Baxter involved the infliction of penalties partially
based on the accused's assertion of the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination,
Baxter is distinguishable from Gardner and Sanitation Men. The probationer in Baxter
was not granted immunity and did not face criminal prosecution. Id. One thus could argue
that Baxter represents a shift from the "public trust" doctrine to a doctrine of "important
state interests," but the factual differences between Baxter and Gardner-Sanitation Men
make such a sweeping conclusion problematic.
The significance of using an "important state interests" standard rather than a "public
trust" standard to compel testimony from a public school student when immunity is granted
should be obvious. To establish that a student is in a position of "public trust" as defined in
Gardner and Sanitation Men is virtually impossible because those cases dealt with public
employees. A public school, however, often will be able to argue convincingly that it has
"important interests" in compelling the testimony of a student suspected of drug dealing
within the school, for example (or in penalizing the alleged student drug dealer by expulsion
if he or she refuses to talk). Indeed, a lesser "important state interests" standard very likely
may sound the death knell of the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination in the
context of school investigations and disciplincfi]and a criminal statute. This section focuses
on the meaning of "coercion" or "compulsion" in a general sense. Fent to convict a student
criminally, the state might grant immunity and then allow the school to expel the alleged
student wrongdoer based on his or her silence (or inferences drawn from that silence) at
school disciplinary hearings or on his or her own "coerced" self-incrimination. For public
policy arguments against such a lesser standard and in support of the "public trust" stan-
dard see infra notes 108-10 and accompanying text.
105. Spevak, 385 U.S. at 520 (Fortas, J., concurring). One district court has acknowledged
that such a distinction exists for public school students. In Caldwell v. Cannady, 340 F.
Supp. 835 (N.D. Tex. 1972), the district court, without citing any case, stated in dicta:
The Court holds that one cannot be denied his Fifth Amendment right to re-
main silent merely because he is a student. . . .This is highly distinguishable
from the duty placed upon a policeman to explain his own conduct at a disci-
plinary hearing or face automatic removal from the force. A policeman is a
representative of a body charged with law enforcement whose conduct must be
absolutely unblemished and above reproach. He is in a position of trust which
he has voluntarily chosen to assume, and in which he is under no pressure to
remain.
Id. at 841 (emphasis added); accord Gonzales v. McEuen, 435 F. Supp. 460, 471 (C.D. Cal.
1977).
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The "public trust" rationale, if extended to the public school
setting, would prevent a public school from imposing any penalty
upon students who refuse to talk to school officials about miscon-
duct that violates both a school rule and a criminal statute, even if
prosecutors grant the student immunity or refrain from using the
statements in future criminal prosecutions." 6 Additionally, the ra-
tionale would prevent courts from admitting against the student in
a civil or criminal proceeding any statements made under such
coercion. 1°7
The fact that Sanitation Men, Gardner, and Garrity are estab-
lished precedent is not the only reason to extend the "public trust"
rationale to public schools when prosecutors grant immunity from
criminal prosecution to the suspected wrongdoer. Significant pub-
lic policy arguments also support implementing the "public trust"
rationale in the public schools and affording public school students
the greatest constitutional protections in school disciplinary hear-
ings and investigations.
If a student facing serious charges of wrongdoing loses the privi-
lege against self-incrimination in the public school setting because
a prosecutor grants use immunity in subsequent criminal prosecu-
tions, one might ask what lesson the student is learning. If, as Jus-
tice White said in Murphy, "every schoolboy is familiar with the
concept, if not the language, of the [fifth amendment],"108 a stu-
dent forced to incriminate him or herself in a school disciplinary
setting will feel unfairly treated regardless of how he or she is
treated in the criminal prosecution. In dissent in T.L.O., Justice
Stevens commented on this very point:
Schools are places where we inculcate the values essential to the
meaningful exercise of rights and responsibilities by a self-gov-
erning citizenry. If the Nation's students can be convicted
through the use of arbitrary methods destructive of personal lib-
106. Obviously, failing to grant immunity while still threatening to impose penalties for
failure to talk would be constitutionally infirm, even when the individual involved is in a
position of public trust.
107. Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 434 (1984).
108. Id. at 437.
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erty, they cannot help but feel that they have been dealt with
unfairly. 09
Justice Brennan also has criticized attempts to diminish consti-
tutional rights afforded students in public schools. He wrote,
"Schools cannot expect their students to learn the lessons of good
citizenship when the school authorities themselves disregard the
fundamental principles underpinning our constitutional
freedoms." 110
The issue, therefore, is not solely one of legal analysis. Presuma-
bly the Court should apply principles of public policy in reaching a
decision in this area. The better resolution of this issue, consistent
with both the case law and public policy, requires the application
of the "public trust" rationale proposed in this Article, thereby al-
lowing public school students to assert the fifth amendment in
school when their alleged misconduct violates both a school rule
and a criminal law, even though they have been granted use immu-
nity by the local authorities.
D. The Need For Miranda Warnings in the Public School Investi-
gatory and Disciplinary Setting
Although the issue of Miranda warnings"' in public schools
resurfaces from time to time,1" 2 the law on this point is quite well
established. The law requires advising people of their constitu-
tional rights to remain silent and to counsel only in connection
with inherently coercive custodial interrogations." 3 In addition,
109. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 373-74 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations
omitted).
110. Doe v. Renfrow, 451 U.S. 1022, 1027-28 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting from denial
of certiorari).
111. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). In Miranda, the Supreme Court held that
authorities must advise suspects in custody, prior to interrogation, that they have the fol-
lowing rights: 1) the right to remain silent, because anything the suspect says may be used
against him or her; 2) the right to have counsel present during interrogation; and 3) if the
suspect is indigent, the right to court-appointed counsel. Id. at 478-79.
112. Students raised the issue of Miranda warnings in school disciplinary hearings and
investigations as early as 1968 and as recently as 1986. See, e.g., Buttny v. Smiley, 281 F.
Supp. 280, 287 (D. Colo. 1968) (involving a university student); Adams v. City of Dothan
Bd. of Educ., 485 So. 2d 757 (Ala. Civ. App. 1986).
113. Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 430 (1984) (citing Roberts v. United States, 445
U.S. 552, 560 (1980)).
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the Supreme Court has held that the Miranda requirements do not
apply to pretrial statements in situations other than criminal
cases.114 Accordingly, because questioning a student in the public
school is not a "custodial" interrogation, the school need not give
Miranda warnings." 5 If a student "voluntarily" speaks to a school
official about potentially criminal conduct, the absence of Miranda
114. Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 315 (1976). This Article assumes that the fifth
amendment's privilege against self-incrimination applies to those school proceedings where
a student's misconduct involves the violation of a criminal statute. The major relevant Mi-
randa issue is whether a student would volunteer a statement about misconduct if he or she
is aware of his or her fifth amendment rights. See supra notes 75-82 and accompanying text.
A related issue concerns whether officials may use a student's "voluntary" statements in the
school's disciplinary proceedings against the student, even if they are excludable in a crimi-
nal proceeding.
115. Wright, supra note 1, at 1077. Lower courts considering this issue almost unani-
mously concur. See Betts v. Board of Educ., 466 F.2d 629, 631 n.1 (7th Cir. 1972); Pollnow v.
Glennon, 594 F. Supp. 220, 224 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd, 757 F.2d 496 (2d Cir. 1985); Buttny v.
Smiley, 281 F. Supp. 280, 287 (D. Colo. 1968); Adams v. City of Dothan Bd. of Educ., 485
So. 2d 757, 761 (Ala. Civ. App. 1986); In re Feazell, 360 So. 2d 907, 908-09 (La. App. 1978);
Birdsey v. Grand Blanc Community Schools, 130 Mich. App. 718, -, 344 N.W.2d 342, 344
(1983); In re Brendan H., 92 Misc. 2d 1077, 1079, 372 N.Y.S.2d 473, 476-77 (1975); State v.
Wolfer, 39 Wash. App. 287, -, 693 P.2d 154, 158 (1984).
The Supreme Court in T.L.O. stressed that school administrators are state actors, exercis-
ing public rather than parental authority when they impact upon the constitutional guaran-
tees of freedom of expression, due process, and search and seizure. New Jersey v. T.L.O.,
469 U.S. 325, 326 (1985). As a result, one can argue strongly that courts should consider a
school official's questioning of a student about criminal misconduct to be "custodial" inter-
rogation, particularly when the student is questioned in the principal's office and feels that
his or her freedom to leave at will has been curtailed. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at
478 (Miranda rules apply while in custody or "deprived of. . . freedom. . . in any signifi-
cant way.").
For purposes of triggering the Miranda warnings, however, the Court construed "custody"
narrowly to include only formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement comparable to
formal arrest. See Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 430-35 (1984) (exploring various as-
pects of Miranda, including factors to consider in determining if one is in custody); Califor-
nia v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1124 (1983); see also United States v. Parr-Pla, 549 F.2d 660,
663 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 972 (1977) (holding that Miranda does not apply to
private interrogations); Boynton v. Casey, 543 F. Supp. 995, 998 (D. Me. 1982) (holding that
denying a student "permission to leave" does not transform questioning by a school official
into a custodial interrogation).
Given the Court's analysis in Murphy, as well as the weight of authority cited above, the
prospects for a successful argument favoring Miranda warnings in the public school setting
are doubtful, even though T.L.O. stressed that school administrators are state actors, and
even though a student being questioned by school officials probably does not feel free to
leave during questioning.
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warnings therefore is not likely to bar the use of any statements in
either a school disciplinary hearing or a criminal proceeding.116
Determining that school officials need not give Miranda warn-
ings to students prior to questioning does not resolve entirely
whether such statements are "volunteered. ' 117 The general rule is
that a person must assert the privilege in a timely fashion or the
statements will be considered volunteered and the privilege
waived."" The Supreme Court has identified three exceptions to
this general rule."19 The first exception excludes statements made
during custodial interrogation in the absence of Miranda warnings;
this exception is based upon the assumption that custodial interro-
gation is inherently coercive. 2 0 The second exception arises when
authorities tell the person they question that exercising the privi-
lege will be penalized.' 2' The final exception flows out of Marchetti
v. United States2 2 and is limited to situations not addressed in
this Article.123
Whether Miranda warnings are given or not, 24 how can one con-
clude that the student-often a minor-"knowingly and intelli-
116. Murphy, 465 U.S. at 430-35; see also Betts v. Board of Educ., 466 F.2d 629, 631 n.1
(7th Cir. 1972) (holding that Miranda warnings are not a requisite of due process but a
condition of admissibility in a criminal prosecution of statements obtained while in custody
or otherwise significantly deprived of freedom).
117. In Miranda, the Court recognized that when a person speaks after receiving Miranda
warnings, a judge still must determine whether that person "knowingly and intelligently
waived his privilege against self-incrimination." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475
(1966). The Court reaffirmed that analysis in 1979 in Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 724
(1979) (dealing with police interrogation of a minor in a murder investigation).
118. Murphy, 465 U.S. at 429.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 429-35.
121. This Article discusses the situation in which officials threaten a student with depri-
vation of a significant educational interest if the student does does not talk. See supra notes
52-74 and accompanying text. The Article concludes that any statements induced by such a
threat would not be considered voluntary even if the student involved did not raise the fifth
amendment. This conclusion is drawn from and is consistent with this second exception
found in Murphy, 465 U.S. at 429-41.
122. 390 U.S. 39 (1968).
123. Marchetti dealt with federal taxes imposed upon gamblers; see Murphy, 465 U.S. at
429-41.
124. Notwithstanding the discussion in the text concerning Miranda not applying in
school interrogations, the better practice seemingly would be for school administrators to
give Miranda warnings, or, alternatively, simply to turn the matter over to the police or
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
gently" waived his or her privilege not to speak? Supreme Court
decisions in somewhat analogous situations guide this inquiry.
First, the Court has stated at least twice that "every schoolboy is
familiar with the concept, if not the language, of the [fifth amend-
ment]." 125 Second, the Court has suggested a case-by-case analysis
to determine if a juvenile has waived his or her fifth amendment
rights, considering the "totality of the circumstances."' 28 "Circum-
stances" to consider include age, experience, education, back-
ground, intelligence, and the juvenile's capacity to understand the
nature of his or her fifth amendment rights and the consequences
of waiving those rights. 2 7
Presumably courts should apply the Fare standards to students
who make incriminating statements when questioned by school of-
ficials. The problem, however, is that Fare's "totality of the cir-
cumstances" test somewhat begs the question and asks school ad-
ministrators to judge a particular student's background and
capacity without giving any real guidance. 12
In conclusion, because courts do not consider the questioning of
a student by a school official to be custodial, Miranda warnings
prior to the questioning are not required. Further, current Su-
preme Court jurisprudence assumes that all school children are fa-
miliar with the concepts of the fifth amendment 29 and, arguably,
therefore any statements are presumed to be intelligent waivers,
exercised with full "knowledge" of one's rights. To the extent that
a particular student in a specific situation claims lack of capacity
to waive his or her rights knowingly, courts should examine each
case on an individual basis to see if the student had the requisite
capacity given the "totality of the circumstances." Accordingly, al-
juvenile authorities if potential criminal sanctions are involved. See Wright, supra note 1, at
1077.
125. Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. at 437 (quoting Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433,
439 (1974)).
126. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 724-25 (1979); accord State v. Wolfer, 39 Wash.
App. 287, __, 693 P.2d 153, 157 (1984).
127. Fare, 442 U.S. at 724-25.
128. In Fare, the dissent, written by Justice Marshall and joined by Justices Brennan and
Stevens, criticized the majority's "totality of the circumstances" test for failing to supply
adequate guidance. Id. at 731 n.2 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
129. Justice Marshall's dissent acknowledged this assumption with approval. Minnesota
v. Murphy, 465 U.S. at 452-53 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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though a prudent policy seeking to avoid controversy and litigation
might require officials to give Miranda warnings prior to question-
ing a student about conduct that is potentially criminal, such
warnings apparently are not the current constitutional
requirement.
IV. CONCLUSION
The current state of the fifth amendment in public schools is far
from consistent. Certainly, students bring the fifth amendment
with them when they enter the schoolhouse door. The fifth amend-
ment departs, however, if students face questions about purely
school rules or policies that reasonably do not implicate a criminal
prosecution. Further, the fifth amendment does not require school
officials to give Miranda-type warnings prior to questioning a stu-
dent, even if the questions concern potentially criminal conduct.
What, then, does the fifth amendment offer to our public school
students? Clearly, if student misconduct violates a school rule and
a criminal statute, school administrators may not use coercive con-
duct to compel a student to incriminate him or herself. This Arti-
cle suggests that courts should consider a school official's conduct
coercive when the administrator threatens deprivation of substan-
tial educational interests if the student does not cooperate. If pros-
ecutors extend immunity from criminal prosecution to the stu-
dents, Supreme Court cases in related areas suggest that students
do not lose any of their fifth amendment protections. Officials may
grant immunity to compel any individuals in positions of "public
trust," usually state employees, to speak or suffer penalties. Be-
cause students are not generally in such positions of "public trust,"
they should be able to remain silent without fear of sanctions in
the form of deprivation of a substantial educational interest.
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